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Data-Driven Campaigning in the 2015 UK General Election 
 
Abstract 
While we know something of data-driven campaigning practices in the US, we know much 
less about the role of data in other national contexts. The 2015 UK General Election offers an 
important case study of how such practices are evolving and being deployed in a different 
setting. This article draws on 31 in-depth interviews with political practitioners involved in 
the use of data for six major UK parties and electoral regulators. These interviews are 
employed to explore the perceived importance of data in contemporary British campaigns, to 
understand the data-based campaign techniques being used by UK parties, and to assess how 
data-driven practices are interacting with the pre-existing institutional context of British 
politics. Going beyond the specifics of the UK case, this study raises questions about the 
comparative, theoretical, and normative dimensions of data-driven politics. 
Keywords  
Election Campaign, Political Parties, Western Europe 
  
Recent years have seen a growing interest in the role played by data in election campaigns. 
Both academic research and popular commentary have focused mainly on the United States 
(see, for example, Grassegger and Krogerus 2017; Hersh 2015; Howard 2006; Issenberg 
2012; Kreiss 2012, 2016; Nickerson and Rogers 2014; Nielsen 2012; Tufekci 2014). While 
some researchers and journalists have now started to consider the role played by data in other 
countries (on the UK, see Cowley and Kavanagh 2015; Crabtree 2010; Ross 2015b; on 
Germany, see Jungherr 2016; on India, see Safi 2017), our understanding of non-US contexts 
remains patchy. 
This study focuses on the 2015 United Kingdom General Election. This case is interesting as 
a specific example of data-driven politics, and also for building theory that can be applied in 
other countries. In the British context, the election saw an increased role for data-driven 
targeting, which some accounts even argued was decisive to the election result (Ross 2015a, 
2015b). Perhaps more importantly, however, from the perspective of comparative theory-
building, the UK example provides a rich resource for those wishing to study data-driven 
politics beyond our knowledge of the US. 
Institutionally, British parties are more like their Western European counterparts, which have 
much higher levels of formal institutionalization than looser, stratarchical US parties (Epstein 
1980; Ware 1996). UK parties also now exist in a multiparty rather than a two-party system 
(McKibben, 2016). The level of resource expended on UK electoral politics is rather more 
typical of the global norm than the largesse of the US system (Falguera et al. 2014; 
Thompson 2012). In short, the UK political system shares several features with other non-US 
political systems. Studying it is an important starting point in generating theory to be applied 
in other countries. 
The institutional backdrop to data-driven politics matters because data-driven politics and 
how it is deployed is about more than technology. Specifically, there is a tendency to mistake 
technologically intensive practices (which data-driven campaigning certainly is) for 
technologically defined practices (which, this article will argue, data-driven campaigning is 
not). Rather, data-driven campaigning, the form it takes, the uses it is put to, and the way it is 
understood is shaped by political context.  
To better understand the role played by data in the 2015 UK election, this article proceeds as 
follows. First, existing literature relevant to data-driven campaigning is examined. This is 
followed by a discussion of the research methods employed, drawing on 31 semi-structured 
elite interviews with individuals involved in the data-driven campaign in 2015. The 
transcripts generated by these interviews are then analyzed to address the article’s research 
questions. Finally, a concluding section examines the comparative, theoretical and normative 
ramifications of this article’s findings. 
Existing Literature 
Recent years have seen a growing interest in the role of data in election campaigns. Tufekci 
talks about computational politics, defined as “applying computational methods to large 
datasets derived from online and off-line data-sources for conducting outreach, persuasion 
and mobilization” (Tufekci 2014, p. 2). Kreiss argues that “contemporary campaigning has 
entered a new technology intensive era… technology-intensive campaigning has reoriented 
parties and campaigns to the backstage infrastructural technology, data and analytics work” 
(Kreiss 2016, pp. 3–4). Nielsen describes the role played by databases in contemporary 
“personalized political communication,” where activists directly contact targeted voters 
(Nielsen 2012. p. 7). What unites these various authors is a belief that data is now shaping the 
way campaigners communicate with voters. Such practices are important to political 
campaigns because they facilitate the efficient allocation of scarce resources.  
There is also agreement (at least among those studying the US) that data-driven campaigning 
practices have evolved significantly in recent years. In part, this is due to increased 
computing power (Nickerson and Rogers 2014; Tufekci 2014). Perhaps more significantly, 
though, there has also been a methodological change, with a move away from area-based 
targeting to individual-based targeting. Nickerson and Rogers note this shift, arguing, 
“Technology allows campaigns to target their outreach tactically at particular individuals and 
then also to aggregate these predictive estimates up to the jurisdiction level to inform large-
scale strategic decision” (2014. p. 53; see also Nielsen 2012).  
Much of the literature in this area also notes the continuity between emerging data-driven 
campaigning and older forms of electoral political communication. Kreiss neatly encapsulates 
this point in his discussion of what he terms the digital opportunity structure, which “are 
features of the political environment and candidates and campaigns’ symbolic material… 
which shape the possibilities for using digital media for a strategic ends” (Kreiss 2016, p. 
109). For example, previous election campaigns and how their outcome is understood can 
play a significant role in the decisions a party takes in the run-up to the next election. Kreiss 
deploys this idea in his comparison of the Democratic and Republican parties in the US, and 
uses it to explain their different experience of developing data-driven campaigning.  
This idea is important not only because it explains the US experience of data-driven 
campaigning, but also because it opens avenues for going beyond that example. There are a 
number of conditional reasons why the US has proved a fertile incubation space for such 
techniques, including the early development of computer-based direct mail methods in 
response to campaign finance regulations, less institutionalized political parties, a vibrant 
consultancy sector and the sheer quantities of money available (for a discussion of these, see 
Anstead and Chadwick 2008). 
The existence of these conditional factors points towards the complexity of trying to 
understand the export of data-driven campaign practices into other national and party 
contexts. Political communication scholars have written a great deal about the spread of US-
developed campaign practices around the world. While some see this as a simple process of 
exportation—what is termed “Americanization” (Mergel 2009; Negrine and 
Papathanassopoulos 1996)—alternative views acknowledge that local political institutions 
and cultures play a huge role in shaping exactly how new practices will be understood and 
deployed (Anstead 2016; Esser et al. 2001; Plasser and Plasser 2002). On this basis, we 
would not expect to see US data-driven campaign practices replicated when they are 
exported, but instead to take a different form, based on local conditions. 
Three additional points about the emerging literature on data-driven campaigning need to be 
made. First, this literature did not emerge out of nowhere. While it has become commonplace 
to claim that locally based campaigning is now secondary to mediated political 
communication (see, for example, Norris 2000), recent decades have seen a revisionist claim 
on both sides of the Atlantic, asserting that local campaigning is influential (for example 
Denver et al. 2004; Gerber and Green 2000; Whiteley and Seyd 2003). Interest in data-driven 
campaigning needs to be understood in this context.  
Second, academic research on data-driven campaigning has provided an important corrective 
to hyperbolic popular discussion (for a critique of this type of account, see Hersh 2015). It is 
hardly surprising that a discourse of electoral omnipotence has developed around data-driven 
campaigning, not least because the discourse is recognizable from a discussion of earlier 
political communication practices. For example, similar arguments were made about 
billboard poster advertising, qualitative research and “spin doctors” (Delaney 2015; Gould 
2011; Price 2005). 
Third, discussions of data-driven politics inevitably contain a normative dimension. At the 
more optimistic end of the spectrum, Nielsen (2012) compares data-driven campaigning 
favorably to mass media and postal campaigning, while Nickerson and Rogers (2014) argue 
that targeting may lead to higher quality interactions between activists and voters. Others are 
far more skeptical. Tufekci (2014) worries that campaigns will emphasize divisive issues that 
resonate with their supporters, while Kreiss and Howard (2010) voice concerns over privacy. 
These arguments are not mutually exclusive. It is entirely conceivable that all these hopes and 
concerns could be realized simultaneously. Taken in unison, these arguments speak to the 
need to include normative concerns in any discussion of data-driven politics.  
With these issues in mind, this article addresses three research questions:  
 What importance do political actors attribute to data-driven targeting in 
contemporary campaigning? What significance do those involved in the 2015 
election campaign attribute to these techniques? 
 What is the state of data-driven campaigning in the UK? What data is being 
gathered and how is it being used? Does the application of these techniques vary 
across political parties? 
Finally, a third research question requires situating data-driven campaigning in a broader 
institutional context: 
 How does data-driven campaigning build on and relate to pre-existing 
campaign practices? What shapes the use of such techniques in UK political 
parties?  
Collectively, these research questions will provide insights into the evolution of data-driven 
campaigning in the UK, and also generate more general hypotheses useful for other national 
contexts. 
The Methodological Challenge of Researching Data-Driven Politics 
Scholars have used several methods to understand data-driven politics. In an innovative 
study, Hersh (2015) purchased datasets from a supplier that serviced Democratic candidates 
in the US to conduct experiments. This study is unusual in having access to actual datasets. 
More traditionally, Nielson (2012) employed an ethnographic approach to study US 
congressional campaigns, while Kreiss (2012, 2016) used interviews to document the 
evolution of data-driven campaigning. With these kinds of qualitative methods, it is 
important to note that even the best access cannot quantify the effects of data-driven 
campaigning. Rather, it allows researchers to address questions related to how important 
actors think these technologies are.  
This study employs in-depth interviews. It is worth considering the strengths and weaknesses 
of interviews, especially in comparison with ethnography. Interviews can provide rich data, 
but can also be criticized because they require the interviewee to provide this information in 
an artificial setting (specifically, a one-to-one conversation with a researcher who prompts 
with various questions) (Brinkmann 2013, Chapter 5). Ethnography, with its focus on 
observing actors, clearly avoids some of these problems. However, the nature of 
ethnography, which involves spending significant amounts of time in the environment being 
studied, makes it hard to undertake comparative analysis across a range of institutions 
(multiple political parties, for example). For this reason, interviews are the best method for 
tackling this project. 
Data-Gathering 
This study draws on a dataset of 31 semi-structured interviews with political actors involved 
in the 2015 UK General Election campaign. Semi-structured discussions involved the 
interviewer working through a list of discussion points. This gave both the interviewer and 
the interviewee some latitude to guide the interview (Bryman 2012). Semi-structured 
interviews are particularly useful for elite interviews, where “elite” is defined as a group with 
exclusive access to information not in the public domain (Dexter 2006). 
This interview sample was gathered through contacting officials in political parties and 
prominent figures in the 2015 campaign. This study did encounter some of the classic 
problems associated with this type of research. Some individuals contacted were unwilling to 
talk, so a “snowball” technique was employed to augment the sample. The virtue of such an 
approach is that an existing interviewee provides the introduction to other possible subjects, 
increasing the likelihood of acceptance (Bryman 2012).  
The sample generated gave us access to several distinctive spaces in UK electoral politics 
(Appendix 1 provides an anonymized list of interviewees). Interviewees spanned the six 
major UK political parties (Conservative Party, Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, Scottish 
National Party [SNP], Green Party and United Kingdom Independence Party [UKIP]). 
Between them, these parties range across the political spectrum, have different levels of 
support and resources, and diverse strategic objectives. In addition, interviewees included 
individuals who had worked nationally at senior levels on campaigns, as well as those who 
had worked locally in constituency campaigns. The constituency campaigners had worked in 
a range of constituency types, including a large city in the North of England containing both 
marginal and safe constituencies, both marginal and safe rural seats in Wales, and seats with 
significant Green and UKIP support. While clearly too small a sample to be statistically 
representative, the range of seats included certainly provides insights into different types of 
constituencies. Talking to both national and local campaigners highlights their different 
experience of the campaign, potentially revealing any of the conflicts that occurred between 
them. Regulators were also interviewed, as the rapidly evolving data-driven campaign 
environment poses challenges for their roles.  
One final data-gathering method was used. A practitioner seminar was held at [removed for 
peer review] on September 14, 2015. As well as providing a space for interaction between 
stakeholders, this allowed for a discussion of preliminary findings from the research. General 
minutes of this meeting were then created.  
Analysis of Transcripts 
The transcripts from the interviews and the meeting minutes were then analyzed. This study 
employed an iterative thematic approach, drawing out the most important themes through 
repeated readings. This method proceeds through several stages, as shown in Figure 1. The 
thematic coding frame developed from this process is shown in Figure 2.  
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
Thematic analysis is powerful for two reasons. First, the location of recurring themes can 
highlight areas of both agreement and tension over a particular issue (Wengraf 2001). 
Second, thematic analysis can be paired up with other data from the interview—notably, who 
the interviewee is, what organization they work for, and what position they held in that 
organization’s hierarchy—to find important points of comparison. This process of “constant 
comparison” between themes and other descriptive data is particularly powerful for seeing 
difference and deviant cases (Barbour 2014). This mitigates the risk of the researcher 
producing overly neat findings. One final point needs to be made about the thematic method 
and how it is used in this article. The analysis section contains several direct quotes from the 
interviewees. These were chosen because they provide useful illustrative examples of the 





The major ethical challenge for studies of this kind relates to the people being interviewed 
and the information they are divulging. The challenge for researchers is to create an 
environment where interviewees can talk frankly but protect those interviewees from any 
negative consequences that their candor might create (Kvale 2008). The best way to do this is 
by anonymizing interviews. An additional ethical requirement is to ensure that interviewees 
understand the nature of the project so they can give informed consent. For this project, this 
was confirmed in person in the interviews, with details of the project being included in the 
interview script. 
Analysis 
Assessing the Effectiveness of the Campaign 
Our interview data suggested three ways in which effectiveness was defined by campaigners. 
First, in the heat of the campaign itself, effectiveness was measured by gathering metrics on 
things such as contact rates, the number of activists working for a party and levels of support 
expressed through online donations (Conservative Party scholar July 22, 2015; senior Labour 
Party campaign official August 4, 2015; National Labour Party campaign official August 6, 
2015; regional Labour Party campaign official August 17, 2015). 
More broadly, after the election, effectiveness was assessed through interpretations of the 
outcome of the campaign. Here, the comments were predictable. The Conservatives (as well 
as some non-Conservatives) noted that the Tory campaign had been run very efficiently, and 
was certainly a highly targeted campaign (constituency Conservative party activist August 2, 
2015; senior Labour Party campaign official August 27, 2015; senior campaign official from 
a political party September 14, 2015; senior Conservative grassroots figure and commentator 
September 15, 2015). Similar analysis emerged from the SNP (senior SNP campaign figure 
August 18, 2015). In contrast, Labour supporters were keen to emphasize the danger of post-
hoc arguments, constructed with the hindsight of Conservative victory. As one senior Labour 
Party campaign official (September 16, 2015) noted, “The victor, as they say, gets to write 
history. And obviously, you know, the Tories now claim this huge degree of sophistication.” 
Finally, on occasions, interviewees attempted to fundamentally redefine the idea of 
effectiveness. One argument that recurred in the interview data (especially among parties that 
had less successful election outcomes) was how even a good data-driven campaign could not 
offset other communication, institutional, and strategic weaknesses (constituency Liberal 
Democrat activist August 20, 2015; constituency Liberal Democrat campaign organizer 
August 21, 2015; senior Labour Party campaign official August 27, 2015; senior Labour 
Party campaign official September 16, 2015). Therefore, it becomes possible to run an 
effective data-driven campaign within an ineffective election campaign. Other interviewees 
also spoke about the role of data in activist mobilization, and the legacy effects this might 
have on a political party in providing a pool of skilled activists that could be called on in the 
future (senior Labour Party campaign official August 4, 2015).  
Data Capabilities of UK Parties 
As expected, the data capabilities of UK parties vary widely. Smaller parties have limited 
capabilities, often simply using MS Excel spreadsheets (Green Party parliamentary candidate 
August 19, 2015; local Green Party activist September 10, 2015). They are only able to bring 
resources to bear on a limited number of seats, with choices largely being driven by where 
prominent leadership figures are running (senior UKIP campaign official August 19, 2015; 
data specialist who has worked for multiple parties August 26, 2015). 
Even among the more established parties there was inequality in terms of access to data. One 
interviewee summarized the ingredients that went into the databases that the parties were 
using: 
There’s the electoral register, there’s the Mosaic data, there’s the census data which is 
fairly good. Not too bad, we’d use it for some stuff. More descriptive, not predictive. 
And we had polling data, and we had a sample of 100,000 and that’s pretty good. 
(Data specialist who has worked for multiple parties August 26, 2015) 
The electoral register provided the foundation for party databases (national Liberal Democrat 
official August 17, 2015; constituency Liberal Democrat campaign organizer August 18 
2015; senior Labour Party campaign official August 27, 2015; senior campaign official from 
a political party September 14, 2015). That said, it was also noted that the UK electoral 
register is a relatively imprecise document with little standardization (research seminar 
September 15, 2015). Our interviews suggest that larger UK political parties are developing 
databases capable of matching multiple years of the electoral register, making for more 
accurate analysis (senior campaign official from a political party September 14, 2015). 
Both census and Mosaic data offer geotagged information that can be used for modeling. The 
last UK census was conducted in 2011, with data sub-divided into 181,408 output areas in 
England and Wales (ONS 2012). As this data is freely available, it was unsurprisingly 
regarded as important by interviewees (national Liberal Democrat official August 17, 2015; 
data specialist who has worked for multiple parties August 26, 2015; senior Labour Party 
campaign official August 27, 2015). Mosaic is a postcode-based database produced by the 
credit rating company Experian, dividing the population up into 67 types, based on income, 
values, and levels of cultural capital (Experian 2015). Access to Mosaic is costly, so was only 
available to larger parties, where it was used for modeling (Conservative Party scholar July 
22, 2015; data specialist who has worked for multiple parties August 26, 2015; senior Labour 
Party campaign official August 27, 2015). The Liberal Democrats tested Mosaic but decided 
not the use it (national Liberal Democrat official August 17, 2015). Interestingly, the Green 
Party invested in Mosaic for the proportional European Elections, using it in the simplest way 
to identify types of voters who might support them and to locate the areas they lived in. They 
did not use Mosaic for the 2015 General Election (senior national and local Green Party 
campaign organizer August 26, 2015). 
The role of polls in data-gathering is complex, meaning that terminology needs to be clearly 
demarked, differentiating public polls, large sample polls, and surveys. For smaller parties, 
notably UKIP, but also the Liberal Democrats, public polls (especially those conducted at the 
constituency level) allowed them to decide which constituencies they might be viable in and 
to target resources accordingly (senior Liberal Democrat activist August 17, 2015; senior 
national UKIP campaign official August 19, 2015).
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 Larger parties were able to conduct their 
own polling, either with large samples or focused on key constituencies (national Liberal 
Democrat official August 17, 2015; data specialist who has worked for multiple parties 
August 26, 2015; senior Labour Party campaign official August 27, 2015). Research at this 
scale is obviously very expensive.  
However, interviewees also revealed that parties were conducting surveys (i.e. non-
representative questionnaires conducted either face-to-face or online) for a very different 
reason—to learn about the specific responder (Conservative Party scholar July 22, 2015; 
senior campaign official from a political party September 14, 2015; senior Liberal Democrat 
activist August 16, 2015). Parties were not interested in undertaking surveys to understand 
public opinion, but rather to augment their databases and to make future political 
communication more effective. 
There seems little doubt that the Conservatives refined these techniques most, as it was the 
Conservative campaign that most effectively adopted the recent US innovation of targeting 
individual voters (Nickerson and Rogers 2014; Nielsen 2012). For instance, one Conservative 
activist described how letters were tailored to individual voters, containing messages 
designed to appeal to them: 
We were given a couple of hundred letters each to go and deliver to people’s doors. 
They were all hand addressed on the envelope… I opened a few of the letters before 
delivering them to have a quick look and see what they’re about. And actually there 
were at least half a dozen different messages being delivered based on rich voter ID 
information. So because these people had had someone knocking on their door, had 
someone talk to them at least once in some cases several times about what interested 
them, what concerned them. (Senior Conservative grassroots figure and commentator 
September 15, 2015; see also senior campaign official from a political party 
September 14, 2015). 
This contrasts with Labour, where targeting was still based on segments. One senior Labour 
Party campaign official (interviewed August 27, 2015), for example, spoke of targeting 
certain demographic groups such as students and pensioners with specific messages (see also 
constituency Labour Party campaign official August 20, 2015).  
The purpose of all this is to increase turnout among would-be supporters. This is an area 
where newer data-driven tactics are bolted on to more traditional political practices. UK 
political parties have long run ‘get out the vote’ operations on polling day (termed “knocking 
up” in British political jargon). This process can now be augmented by months and perhaps 
years of earlier data-gathering (senior Labour Party campaign official August 27, 2015). This 
ensures that finite supplies of activists can be used efficiently to maximize vote share. 
Additionally, data-driven campaigning also has the potential to change the very definition of 
the political base of a party. While previously this might have been defined through 
geography, the move to individual targeting means that parties can target would-be voters 
whose political views are different to most of their neighbors, who previously would have 
been ignored (senior campaign official from a political party September 14, 2015). 
Implementing data-driven campaigning did produce challenges. Our interviewees highlighted 
two: gathering and entering data at the local level, and managing activists. Data-gathering 
was challenging for several reasons. In the first instance, members of the public may simply 
react angrily when approached by canvassers from political parties (Conservative Party 
scholar July 22, 2015; constituency Conservative Party activist August 1, 2015). Designing 
suitable data-gathering instruments also proved problematic for parties (research seminar 
September 15, 2015; senior Labour Party campaign official September 16, 2015. See also 
Ross 2015b). Traditionally, canvassers were asked to fill in returns on party preference and 
whether that preference was weak or strong. Labour retained this system in 2015. The 
Conservatives moved to an alternative system, which used a 1–10 ranking score to indicate 
strength of preference. While controversial when implemented, this model of data-gathering 
arguably allowed for much more granular targeting later. Some local parties also struggled to 
ensure that data was properly recorded (constituency Labour Party campaign official August 
20, 2015). In response to challenges of this kind, some parties experimented with smartphone 
apps and Palm Pilots where canvassers could upload data in real time. This seems to have 
been particularly prominent among the Liberal Democrats (senior national Liberal Democrat 
official August 5, 2015; senior Liberal Democrat activist August 17, 2015; constituency 
Liberal Democrat activist August 20, 2015).  
A second challenge is managing activists. There are two issues here. The first relates to skills. 
As one senior Labour Party campaign official (interviewed September 16, 2015) noted, it is 
hard to run a modern data-driven campaign when your activists are “80-year-old, well-
meaning… not massively switched on, a bit deaf.” This might be a caricature, but the 
evidence on political party membership suggests that party members are considerably older 
than the average citizen (van Biezen et al. 2012).
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 To combat this problem, parties had 
developed systems to train their activists in how to gather and handle data. For example, the 
Liberal Democrats had a series of online videos on the subject (constituency Liberal 
Democrat campaign organizer August 21, 2015). 
The second issue relates to geography, and especially where activists live and are willing to 
campaign. At its most extreme, this problem might involve vast numbers of party members 
wanting to campaign in safe seats. To overcome this, parties tried to persuade activists to be 
more mobile, setting up traveling campaign groups such as the Conservatives’ Team2015 
(senior Conservative grassroots figure and commentator September 15, 2015), or twinning 
safe and marginal constituencies (regional Labour Party campaign official August 16, 2015; 
senior Labour Party campaign official August 27, 2015). However, there were limits to what 
could be achieved, since political parties are voluntary organizations.  
Data and the Institutional Context 
This discussion provides some insights into the perceived effectiveness and data-driven 
capabilities of UK political parties. To better understand how these practices have evolved 
requires us to think about how they have interacted with the UK political system. Broadly, 
five explanations stand out as having particular significance: the data regulatory framework; 
the electoral system; the psephology of contemporary elections; the geo-institutional form 
that campaigns now take; and the underlying cultures of political parties. This list is not 
exhaustive, and it is certainly possible to identify additional factors. However, taken together, 
these factors have clearly played an important role in shaping data-driven campaigning 
practices in the UK.  
In comparison with the US, UK political parties have far less access to the types of data 
required to target voters. The most obvious omission is the lack of an electoral register that 
identifies voters by partisan preference, as exists in many US states (Hersh 2015). It is also 
important to note that the UK has much stronger data protection laws. Among those involved 
in data-driven campaigning in the UK, data protection requirements divided opinion. Some 
did not see them as onerous (senior Labour Party campaign official August 4, 2015; national 
Labour Party campaign official August 5, 2015), while others found them a major 
impingement (constituency Liberal Democrat activist August 20, 2015; constituency Labour 
Party campaign official August 20, 2015). There was also some awareness that parties in the 
US could access data more easily than their UK counterparts (senior Labour Party campaign 
official August 27, 2015). To some degree at least, parties ensured that they had the 
necessary expertise and training in data protection regulation, and that data resources were 
kept secure (for example, constituency Liberal Democrat campaign organizer August 18, 
2015; constituency Labour Party campaign official August 20, 2015; constituency Liberal 
Democrat campaign organizer August 21, 2015). The Information Commissioner’s Office 
(interviewed September 11, 2015) also offered training to political parties before the election 
to ensure compliance with data protection legislation.  
While the lack of available data may make data-driven campaigning harder in the UK, it is 
arguable that other elements of the British political system incentivize targeted campaigns. 
Perhaps the most significant among these reasons is the UK’s first-past-the-post electoral 
system, which can generate massively disproportionate results (Gallagher 2015).
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 The 
ramification of this is that some voters, depending on where they live, will wield relatively 
greater influence than voters who live elsewhere (Petts 2015). A political system where this is 
the case incentivizes parties to use their resources to target voters who are most vital to their 
success. In the interviews conducted for this project, this was evident first in the decisions 
made by the larger political parties (especially the Conservatives) about which seats to target, 
and then which voters to target within those seats. The Conservatives developed what they 
termed a 40–40 strategy (based on defending 40 tight seats and winning an additional 40 for a 
majority) (Cowley and Kavanagh 2015). What was most striking about this list of seats is that 
it was not constructed based on their marginality. Rather, they were defined by what the party 
knew about the types of voters living in them, their propensity to swing to and away from the 
Conservatives, their reactions to certain messages, and other seat-specific factors, such as 
whether an incumbent was standing down (Conservative Party scholar July 22, 2015). These 
seats were lavished with resources, and the national party closely monitored campaigns being 
conducted there (senior Conservative grassroots figure and commentator September 16, 
2015).  
These tendencies are exacerbated by the UK party system and the psephology of 
contemporary elections. In terms of overall vote share, the two major British political parties 
have been in decline for several decades, and are now having to exist in a more complex, 
multi-party system (McKibbin 2016). The last two majority governments in the UK have 
been achieved with the lowest vote share in modern history—Labour in 2005 with 35.2 
percent and the Conservatives in 2015 with 36.9 percent (Audickas et al. 2016). While it did 
not come up explicitly in our interviews, it is not hard to see how this new political 
environment would encourage data-driven campaigning. Parties now need to navigate a more 
complex topography, where constructing a majority becomes a matter of what might be 
referred to as the aggregation of marginal gains.  
Data-driven targeting techniques are also changing the geo-institutional form of UK election 
campaigns, especially how we define national and local campaigning efforts. The interviews 
provided some evidence of growing central control over the periphery of campaigns, 
matching predictions made by political scientists (Norris 2000). This process was not uniform 
or one-sided, however. There was also some conflict between the national and local parties, 
with the latter often critiquing the actions of the former (Conservative Party scholar July 22, 
2015; constituency Conservative activist August 2, 2015). Additionally, as has been noted 
elsewhere (Barwell 2016), some non-target seats ran vigorous, locally based campaigns. 
Nevertheless, national control of local campaigns was clearly occurring, especially in 
marginal seats targeted by political parties (senior Conservative grassroots figure and 
commentator September 16, 2015; senior Labour Party campaign official September 16, 
2015).  
Significantly, these developments provide a fundamental challenge to the way UK campaign 
finance law works. This is because the system is based on two sets of spending limits, one 
national and one local (Anstead 2008). The logic behind this system assumes a neat 
institutional separation between the two. Our interviews uncovered a great deal of anger 
about how parties, especially the Conservatives, had used this system to distribute national 
resources in local contexts. The Liberal Democrats were particularly angry about this, as they 
clearly felt they had been targeted with these techniques (senior Liberal Democrat activist 
August 17, 2015; constituency Liberal Democrat activist August 20, 2015; research seminar 
September 15, 2015). Additionally, representatives of the Electoral Commission (interviewed 
September 23, 2015) noted that they had received several requests for definitions on local and 
national spending, both from parties keen to ensure their own practice was appropriate and 
from parties worried about the activities of their opponents. In the months following our 
interviews, several high-profile investigations were launched into spending practices during 
the election, focusing on exactly these questions (Belam 2016). The rights and wrongs of the 
issue are beyond the scope of this article, but what is clear is that there is ambiguity in how to 
regulate these newly emerging, centrally dictated, local campaigns. 
Finally, longstanding cultures within political parties played a significant role in shaping their 
use of data and local campaigns. Prior to the election, Labour was very confident in its ability 
to mobilize its support base. This seems to have been because of a belief that the party had 
fought a strong election campaign in this regard in 2010, avoiding a much more damaging 
defeat (senior Labour Party campaign official August 27, 2015; senior Labour Party 
campaign official September 16, 2015). This reading of the events of 2010 may well be true. 
Certainly, some of Labour’s opponents believed it (for example, senior campaign official 
from a political party September 14, 2015). However, it is also important to note that this 
reading of events is also a comforting one for a party founded as the political wing of the 
trade union movement and which lauds community-based activism (McKenzie 1963). It is 
therefore not surprising that a narrative focused on grassroots communication became central 
to Labour’s election campaign, when the party heavily publicized its idea of having 4 (later 
5) million conversations with members of the British electorate (senior Labour Party 
campaign official August 4, 2015; see also Hope 2015). 
This approach was not universally popular with Labour’s election team. Some argued that it 
prioritized quantity of interaction over quality (regional Labour Party campaign official 
August 17, 2015), while others saw it as an attempt to paper over the party’s lack of a 
compelling overarching policy narrative (senior Labour Party campaign official September 
16, 2015). It also contrasts sharply with the Conservatives. The Tories spent the years before 
the election constructing powerful political messages, especially on the economy and 
Labour’s lack of fiscal rectitude (Clarke et al. 2015). To this, in the weeks before the election, 
was added the message of the potential dangers of a Labour/SNP coalition, targeted at the 
voters who were most likely to be responsive (Conservative Party scholar July 22, 2015; 
senior national Liberal Democrat official, August 5, 2015). This is a precise inversion of 
Labour’s approach—for Labour, the campaign was the narrative; for the Conservatives, the 
campaign was a mechanism to distribute their narrative. 
Conclusions 
While post-election discussion in the UK has focused heavily on the role of data in the 
unexpected Conservative victory, this article offers a more nuanced analysis. Data 
capabilities are distributed very unevenly among UK political parties. It is only the 
Conservatives who seem to have adopted the US model of individual-level targeting. Labour 
does engage in data-driven campaigning and can call on a formidable number of activists, but 
still uses segment-based targeting, making its efforts less targeted. The capabilities of smaller 
parties lag far behind, although there are examples of innovation, such as the Liberal 
Democrats’ use of smartphone applications and Palm Pilots.  
Going beyond the specifics of the British case, the arguments made in this article lead to a 
variety of conclusions. Broadly, these can be divided into three areas: comparative, 
theoretical and normative. 
In comparative terms, the arguments made in this article lead to several hypotheses that could 
be examined in other countries. This is because certain elements of the UK political system 
seem to hamper data-driven campaigning, while other elements seem to enhance it. A relative 
lack of access to data is clearly a problem for UK parties, but it should be remembered that it 
is the US—with its very lax data regime—that is the outlier in comparative terms. Of the 
incentives to employ data-driven campaigning in the UK, the election system is surely 
preeminent, as it necessarily forces parties to focus their energies on certain would-be voters 
in a narrow number of seats. This raises the possibility of a more general hypothesis about the 
relationship between data-driven targeting and election system disproportionality—in short, 
other things being equal, do parties develop data-driven capabilities more rapidly in electoral 
systems with a tendency towards disproportionate outcomes? Similarly, the experiences of 
the Labour Party in 2015 raise the question of whether parties with strong traditions of 
activism find it harder to implement data-driven campaigning techniques. They may have the 
supporters needed for door-to-door campaigning, but might struggle to integrate the types of 
professional expertise and control mechanisms needed for effective targeting.  
Theoretically, the development of data-driven campaigning problematizes the boundaries that 
have traditionally been used to study election campaigns. When national parties are managing 
constituency campaigns, where does that leave the distinction between national and local 
campaigning? This is not just a problem for political scientists seeking to study the effects of 
various parts of the campaign, but also for any election regulators who must apply the law in 
specific contexts. The line between the so-called “air war” of mediated communication and 
the “ground war” of face-to-face contact is also increasingly blurred. This is most evident in 
the Conservatives’ careful construction of political narratives in the years before the election, 
which were then deployed to target certain voters who were likely to be responsive. It is also 
important to think about the development of data-driven campaigning and how it relates to 
political institutions. On some occasions it seems that institutions shape the way parties 
deploy these techniques. Think, for example, of the Conservative Party targeting certain 
constituencies within the UK’s first-past-the-post election system or the Green Party’s 
decision to purchase Mosaic for the European Elections, conducted under proportional 
representation. At the same time, data-driven campaigning is reshaping institutions, altering 
the way in which parties spend money, potentially undermining the UK’s campaign finance 
laws. 
No discussion of data-driven campaigning would be complete without considering its 
normative dimension. The experience of the UK in 2015 points to two significant concerns. 
The first relates to the unequal resources wielded by political parties, with larger parties able 
to invest more heavily. Data-driven campaigning might even be a form of cartelization (Katz 
and Mair 1995), where large parties erect barriers to protect their dominance from new 
entrants. Certainly, the high expense of new campaigning techniques seriously disadvantages 
smaller and newer parties. Second, data-driven campaigning may change how voters interact 
with parties. Data-driven politics is about communicating efficiently, talking to voters who 
are most useful to a campaign. However, inefficient targeting might lead to better democratic 
outcomes, as it could include more people in the electoral conversation. As systems become 
more efficient, that externality might be lost. 
Data-driven politics is likely to be much talked about in the coming years by academics, 
journalists, and political practitioners. While it might play a role in reshaping political parties, 
campaigning practices, election outcomes, and how voters relate to politics, it will also be 
grounded in pre-existing political practices in specific contexts. This makes for a complicated 
picture, although this complexity makes the need to understand data-driven campaigning no 
less pressing. On the contrary, that is precisely why we must understand it. 
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Appendix 1: Anonymized List of Interviewees and Interviewers 
 
Interviewee known as: Method Date  
Conservative Party scholar Skype July 22, 2015 
Constituency Conservative Party activist Skype August 2, 
2015 
Senior Labour Party campaign official Skype August 4, 
2015 
Senior national Liberal Democrat official In person August 5, 
2015 
National Labour Party data specialist In person August 6, 
2015 
National Labour Party activist Skype August 14, 
2015 
Senior Liberal Democrat activist In person August 17, 
2015 
Regional Labour Party campaign director Telephone August 17, 
2015 
National Liberal Democrat official In person August 17, 
2015 
Constituency Liberal Democrat campaign organizer Telephone August 18, 
2015 
Senior Scottish National Party (SNP) campaign figure FaceTime August 18, 
2015 
Senior Liberal Democrat campaign official In person August 18, 
2015 
Green Party parliamentary candidate Skype August 19, 
2015 
Senior United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 
campaign official  
In person August 19, 
2015 
Constituency Liberal Democrat activist Skype August 20, 
2015 
Constituency Labour Party activist In person August 20, 
2015 
Constituency Labour Party campaign official In person August 20, 
2015 
Constituency Liberal Democrat campaign organizer Skype August 21, 
2015 
Data specialist who has worked for multiple 
parties 
Telephone August 26, 
2015 
Senior national and local Green Party campaign Telephone August 26, 
official 2015 
Senior Labour Party campaign official Telephone August 27, 
2015 
Local Green Party activist In person September 10, 
2015 
Constituency Green Party data specialist In person September 10, 
2015 
Senior Information Commissioner’s Office official Telephone September 11, 
2015 
Senior Information Commissioner’s Office official Telephone September 11, 
2015 
Senior campaign official from a political party In person September 14, 
2015 
Conservative Party MP In person September 15, 
2015 
Senior Conservative Party grassroots figure and 
commentator 
Telephone September 15, 
2015 
Senior Labour Party campaign official In person September 16, 
2015 
Electoral Commission official In person September 23, 
2015 




1. Anonymized interview transcripts are available in an online repository. Please contact the 
author for access. 
2. The largest number of constituency polls ever carried out in a UK general election was in 
2015. Like national polls, they proved to be inaccurate (Cowley and Kavanagh 2015). While 
the interviews for this project do not provide any direct insights on the topic, it will be 
interesting to see if smaller parties rely so heavily on similar polls in future election cycles. 
Given their relatively scarce resources, it seems likely that they will have little choice. 
3. It remains to be seen if the new wave of party membership surrounding Jeremy Corbyn 
changes the demographics of party activism. The ongoing ERSC-funded project on party 
membership should offer some insights into this in the future (Bale et al. 2016). 
4. In this context, disproportionately refers to the discrepancy between the total vote share 
achieved by a political party and the number of seats won. 
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